Notes

Outline

Bioterrorism: An Overview Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Bioterrorism

History of Biological Warfare 14th Century: Plague at Kaffa

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History of Biological Warfare 18th Century: Smallpox Blankets

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History of Biological Warfare 20th Century: 1943: USA program launched 1953: Defensive program established 1969: Offensive program disbanded

Biological Warfare Agreements 1925 Geneva Protocol 1972 Biological Weapons Convention 1975 Geneva Conventions Ratified

Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism: Who are 1st Responders? Primary Care Personnel Hospital ER Staff EMS Personnel Public Health Professionals Other Emergency Preparedness Personnel Laboratory Personnel Law Enforcement

Potential Bioterrorism Agents Bacterial Agents Anthrax Brucellosis Cholera Plague, Pneumonic Tularemia Q Fever Source: U.S. A.M.R.I.I.D.

Biological Agents of Highest Concern Variola major (Smallpox) Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax) Yersinia pestis (Plague) Francisella tularensis (Tularemia) Botulinum toxin (Botulism) Filoviruses and Arenaviruses (Viral hemorrhagic fevers) ALL suspected or confirmed cases should be reported to health authorities immediately

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Advantages of Biologics    as Weapons Infectious via aerosol Organisms fairly stable in environment Susceptible civilian populations High morbidity and mortality Person-to-person transmission (smallpox,   plague, VHF) Difficult to diagnose and/or treat Previous development for BW

Advantages of Biologics as Weapons Easy to obtain Inexpensive to produce Potential for dissemination over large geographic area Creates panic Can overwhelm medical services Perpetrators escape easily

Bioterrorism: How Real is the Threat? Hoax vs. Actual BT Event

Anthrax Bioterrorism

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Chemical & Biological  Terrorism 1984:  The Dalles, Oregon, Salmonella  (salad bar) 1991:  Minnesota, ricin toxin (hoax) 1994:  Tokyo, Sarin and biological attacks 1995:  Arkansas, ricin toxin (hoax) 1995:  Ohio, Yersinia pestis (sent in mail) 1997:  Washington DC, “Anthrax” (hoax) 1998:  Nevada , non-lethal strain of B. anthracis 1998:  Multiple “Anthrax” hoaxes

Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination The Dalles, Oregon in Fall of 1984 751 cases of Salmonella Eating at salad bars in 10 restaurants Criminal investigation identified perpetrators as followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh

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Shigellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination Dallas, Texas in Fall of 1996 12 (27%) of 45 laboratory workers in a large medical center had severe diarrheal illness 8 (67%) had positive stool cultures for S. dysenteriae type 2 Eating muffins or donuts in staff break room implicated PFGE patterns indistinguishable for stool, muffin, and laboratory stock isolates Criminal investigation in progress

Federal Agencies Involved in Bioterrorism NSC DOD FEMA DOJ DHHS Treasury EPA FBI PHS CDC Secret Service USDA FDA SBCCOM USAMRIID OEP

Cost of Bioterrorism

Agent Transmission

Routes of Infection Skin Cuts Abrasions Mucosal membranes

Routes of Infection Gastrointestinal Food Potentially significant route of delivery Secondary to either purposeful or accidental exposure to aerosol Water Capacity to affect large numbers of people Dilution factor Water treatment may be effective in removal of agents

Routes of Infection Respiratory Inhalation of spores, droplets & aerosols Aerosols most effective delivery method 1-5F droplet most effective

Medical Response to Bioterrorism

Medical Response Pre-exposure active immunization prophylaxis identification of threat/use

Medical Response Incubation period diagnosis active and passive immunization antimicrobial or supportive therapy

Medical Response Overt disease diagnosis treatment may not be available may overwhelm system may be less effective direct patient care will predominate

Public Health Response to Bioterrorism

Priorities for Public Health Preparedness Emergency Preparedness and  Response Enhance Surveillance and Epidemiology Enhance Laboratory Capacity Enhance Information Technology Stockpile

Components of a Public           Health Response to  Bioterrorism * Detection - Health Surveillance * Rapid Laboratory Diagnosis * Epidemiologic Investigation * Implementation of Control                      Measures

Laboratory Response Network  For Bioterrorism

CDC BT Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Lab BSL -3 Agent Identification and Specimen Triage Refer to and Assist Specialty Lab Confirmation Evaluate Rapid Detection Technology Rapid Response Team

Bioterrorism: What Can Be Done? Awareness Laboratory Preparedness Plan in place Individual & collective protection Detection & characterization

Bioterrorism: What Can Be Done? Emergency response Measures to Protect the Public’s Health and Safety Treatment Safe practices